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ARBITRATOR’S EVIDENT PARTIALITY: CURRENT U.S. STANDARDS AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS BASED ON COMPARATIVE REVIEWS 
By 
Seung-Woon Lee* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 In international arbitration, the arbitrator should be impartial and independent 
when rendering an arbitral award.1 This is especially important considering the fact that 
parties lack judicial protection in arbitral proceedings.2 To avoid challenges to arbitral 
awards based on an arbitrator’s evident partiality, many arbitral institutions require 
arbitrators to disclose a relationship with related parties.3 This is because challenges to 
arbitral awards based on an arbitrator’s evident partiality necessarily invite courts to 
review the arbitral awards.4  
 Each jurisdiction reviews an arbitrator’s evident partiality with different 
standards. In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Section 10(a)(2) 
permits an arbitral award to be vacated “where there was evident partiality;” one of four 
limited grounds for vacatur in the FAA. 5  The U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co. that an “arbitrator is required to 
disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of bias.”6 However, 
because Justice Black’s opinion was plurality, there is a circuit split as to which standard 
                                                 
* Seung-Woon Lee is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1  See Ann Ryan Robertson, International Arbitration in the U.S.: Evident Partiality Based on 
Nondisclosure: Betwixt and Between, 45 HOUSTON LAW. 22, 23 (2007). 
2 See Lindsay Melworm, Biased? Prove It: Addressing Arbitrator Bias and the Merits of Implementing 
Broad Disclosure Standards, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 431, 435 (2014). 
3 See American Arbitration Association, AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes 
Canon II, IV (2004); see also The London Court of International Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules Art. 
5.4 (2014); Singapore International Arbitration Centre, SIAC Code of Ethics for an Arbitrator 2.1, 2.2 
(2015); Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules Art. 11.4 
(2013); Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, HKIAC Code of Ethical Conduct, Rule Two 
http://www.hkiac.org/arbitration/arbitrators/code-of-ethical-conduct (last visited Apr. 19. 2017); The 
International Bar Association, IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2014).  
4 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE, 331 (2d ed. 2016). 
5 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2) (2012). 
6 Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
courts will apply when reviewing parties’ challenges.7  In Morelite Constr. Crop. v. 
N.Y.C Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. Funds, the Second Circuit applied a higher than 
“impression of bias” but lower than “actual bias” standard.8  In contrast, in Positive 
Software Solutions v. New Century Mortg. Corp., the Fifth Circuit applied a “reasonable 
impression of bias” standard.9  
 This article will first address the current circuit split on the standard used when 
reviewing arbitrators’ partiality after Commonwealth Coatings. This article will then 
address other jurisdictions’ standards of review, particularly England, which applies an 
“actual bias” standard, and France, which applies a more liberal approach.10 This article 
will then focus on how international arbitration institutions regulate an arbitrator’s duty 
to disclose to avoid partiality challenges. Finally, this article will assess the possible 
solutions to the current standard of review. 
II. THE U.S. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Foundation of Evident Partiality: Commonwealth Coatings 
The only case reviewing this issue by the U.S. Supreme Court is Commonwealth 
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co. 11  In Commonwealth Coatings, the neutral 
arbitrator failed to disclose that he had previously served sporadically as an engineering 
consultant for one of the parties.12 This relationship was sporadic in a sense that it was 
used only from time to time, and parties had no dealings for about a year immediately 
before the arbitral proceedings.13 However, the Court held that the neutral arbitrator’s 
failure to disclose the prior relationship justified vacatur of the arbitral award on grounds 
of evident partiality.14 
                                                 
7 See Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007) cert. 
denied, U.S., 127 S. Ct. 293 (2007); see also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters 
Ben. Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984). 
8 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84. 
9 Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 283. 
10 See Pedro Sousa Uva, A Comparative Reflection on Challenge of Arbitral Awards Through the Lens of 
the Arbitrator’s Duty of Impartiality and Independence, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479, 488, 498 (2009). 
11 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 145. 
12 Id. at 146. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 149. 
In his plurality opinion, Justice Black found that an arbitrator should disclose any 
relationships or dealings that might create an impression of bias.15 Relying on Tumey v. 
Ohio, Justice Black found that arbitral awards should be vacated when there is “the 
slightest pecuniary interest” on the part of arbitrator.16 Interestingly, Justice Black drew 
a hard line requiring that an arbitrator should be more impartial than judges, since the 
arbitrator has completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject 
to appellate review.” 17  Thus, Justice Black’s opinion suggested that an arbitrator’s 
nondisclosure itself was sufficient to vacate an arbitral award.18 
In contrast, in a concurring opinion, Justice White, somewhat clarified that “the 
Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial 
decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.”19 Furthermore, Justice White 
clarified that an arbitrator’s nondisclosure itself does not necessarily vacate an arbitral 
award. 20  This concurring opinion caused lower courts to interpret Commonwealth 
Coatings as a plurality opinion, thereby causing a circuit split with regard to how to 
interpret “evident partiality”.21 Thus, although Commonwealth Coatings established that 
an arbitrator’s nondisclosure may suffice for vacating arbitral awards based on evident 
partiality, it has caused a circuit split. 
B. The Second Circuit: Reasonable Person Standard 
With the uncertainty of the law following Commonwealth Coatings, the Second 
Circuit in Morelite established its own interpretation of evident partiality.22 The court 
recognized that the appearance of bias standard is too low, but that the actual bias standard 
is too high.23 In addition, the court found that the standards for disqualifications of 
                                                 
15 Id.  
16 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). 
17 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring). 
20 Id. 
21 See Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 83; see also Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 78 (2d Cir. 2012); Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret 
Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007); Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 282. 
22 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 83; see also Collin Koenig, If We Could, Then So Can You: The 
Seventh Circuit Resurrects Its Judge Versus Arbitrator Analogy to Reinstate a Repeat Arbitrator, 2012 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 265, 269 (2012). 
23 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84. 
arbitrators are less rigid than those for federal judges. 24  Thus, the court adopted a 
reasonable person standard: the court would find “evident partiality” where “a reasonable 
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 
arbitration.”25    
The reasonable person standard from Morelite was followed by Applied Industrial 
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S.,26  in which an arbitrator 
unilaterally erected a “Chinese Wall”27  to avoid conflict.28  In affirming the district 
court’s decision to vacate the arbitral award, the Second Circuit stated: 
 
Arbitrators must take steps to ensure that the parties are not misled into 
believing that no nontrivial conflict exists. It therefore follows that where 
an arbitrator has reason to believe that a nontrivial conflict of interest 
might exist, he must (1) investigate the conflict (which may reveal 
information that must be disclosed under Commonwealth Coatings) or (2) 
disclose his reasons for believing there might be a conflict and his 
intention not to investigate.29 
 
The court further recognized that mere failure to investigate does not necessarily suffice 
to vacate an award; however, an arbitrator has a duty to investigate once he knows that 
potential conflicts may exist. 30  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that failure to 
investigate is “indicative of evident partiality.”31 The court accordingly found that an 
arbitrator’s subjective good faith is not a test; instead, the arbitrator has a “continuing 
duty” to ensure partiality to parties.32 
In Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., the court 
showed that under the reasonable person standard for evident partiality is difficult to meet, 
                                                 
24 Id. at 83 (quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1009, 104 S. Ct. 529, 78 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1983)). 
25 Id. at 84. 
26 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137. 
27 See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at Westlaw BLACKS (providing legal definitions 
of “ethical wall” as, “A screening mechanism maintained by an organization . . . to protect client 
confidences from improper disclosure . . . . ”). 
28 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 135-36. 
29 Id. at 138. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 139. 
reaffirming the idea that nondisclosure itself is not sufficient to vacate an arbitral award.33 
In Scandinavian Reinsurance, two of three panels failed to disclose that they were 
simultaneously serving as a panel member in another arbitration proceeding: “Platinum 
Arbitration.”34 The district court found that the Platinum Arbitration “overlapped in time, 
shared similar issues, involved related parties, [and] included . . . a common witness.”35 
However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that there was 
no evident partiality. 36  The court considered four factors in applying the evident 
partiality test set by Applied Industrial. 37  The court found that an undisclosed 
relationship does not constitute evident partiality, because there was no “material 
relationship with a party.”38 The court emphasized that closeness to the facts of the 
arbitration does not matter; what matters is how strongly the relationship indicates the 
possibility of bias to one party.39 In conclusion, although the Second Circuit’s reasonable 
person standard is less rigid than the actual bias test, because the burden of proof falls to 
the challenging party, it is still difficult to prove that there is a material relationship that 
could tend to show evident partiality.  
C. The Fifth Circuit: Reasonable Impression of Bias 
In Positive Software, the arbitrator failed to disclose that he and other members in 
his firm represented Intel in litigation involving seven law firms, six lawsuits, and 34 
lawyers.40 The attorney who was representing New Century in the arbitral proceeding 
had also represented Intel.41 However, the facts indicated that the arbitrator and attorney 
                                                 
33 Scandinavian Reinsurance Co., 668 F.3d at 74. 
34 Id. at 68. 
35 Scandinavian Reinsurance Co., 668 F.3d at 63 (quoting Scandinavian Reins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 732 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
36 Id. at 78. 
37  Id. at 74 (citing Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., 492 F.3d 520, 530 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
(explaining that these factors are, “(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or 
otherwise, of the arbitrator in the proceedings; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator 
and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitrator; and (4) the 
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding”). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 75 (“[E]ven if a particular relationship might be thought to be relevant ‘to the arbitration at issue,’ 
. . . [it will] not constitute a material conflict of interest if it does not itself tend to show that the arbitrator 
might be predisposed in favor of one (or more) of the parties.”) 
40 Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 280. 
41 Id. 
did not engage in judicial proceedings together.42 Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s rehearing 
en banc, Judge Reavley, in accordance with Justice Black’s opinion in Commonwealth 
Coatings, affirmed the district court’s decision vacating the arbitral award, concluding 
that “evident partiality is demonstrated from the nondisclosure regardless of whether 
actual bias is established.”43 Thus, Judge Reavley applied the reasonable impression of 
bias standard in assessing evident partiality. 
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the district 
court’s vacatur of the arbitral award.44 In accordance with Justice White’s opinion in 
Commonwealth Coatings, the Fifth Circuit focused on applying the reasonable 
impression of bias standard practically.45 The court provided the standard will be: “in 
nondisclosure cases, an award may not be vacated because of a trivial or insubstantial 
prior relationship between the arbitrator and the parties to the proceeding.”46 The court 
focused on public policy issues supporting the practical application of the reasonable 
impression of bias standard. 47  The court stated that the “mere appearance of bias” 
standard will encourage the losing party to challenge the award after it has been rendered, 
thereby jeopardizing the finality of the arbitral award.48 In addition, the court recognized 
that applying the mere appearance of bias standard may limit arbitrators where a repeat 
arbitrator problem exists because of arbitrator’s industrial expertise, thereby harming 
arbitration at large.49 
Following Positive Software, in Dealer Compute Services v. Michael Motor Co., 
the Fifth Circuit addressed issues regarding parties’ waiver of arbitrator’s disclosure.50 
MMC moved to vacate the arbitral award arguing that one of arbitrator’s disclosures were 
insufficient.51 The court concluded that a challenging party waives its right to challenge 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 436 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 
476 F.3d 278 (2007). 
44 Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 286. 
45 Id. at 283. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 285. 
48 Id. 
49 Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 285; see also William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The 
Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 653 (2009) (explaining that “repeat players” are 
arbitrators who might be appointed several times by the same party or the firms due to their industrial 
experiences). 
50 Dealer Comput. Servs. v. Michael Motor Co., 485 F. App'x 724, 727 (5th Cir. 2012). 
51 Id. at 726 (providing that MMC argued that Butner fail to strictly comply with the requirements in light 
of the arbitration provision and AAA code of ethics because the “[arbitrator] did not disclose the fact that 
arbitrator’s partiality, if it fails to challenge during the arbitral proceedings.52 However, 
the court recognized that when the party did not have knowledge of the partiality, the 
waiver rule does not apply.53 In Dealer Compute Services, the court concluded that the 
arbitrator’s disclosure was sufficient to put MMC, the challenging party, on notice of the 
potential conflict.54 Thus, the court found that MMC by failing to object during the 
arbitral proceedings, waived its right to challenge the arbitral award.55 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s practical application of the reasonable impression of bias 
standard is less rigid than Justice Black’s opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, and makes 
failure to disclose non-substantial relationships insufficient to vacate an arbitral award.56 
The underlying reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s approach is an effort to sustain the finality 
of arbitral awards in line with the “empathic federal policy favoring arbitration.”57 
D. The Seventh Circuit: Less Rigid Impartiality Standards Than Federal Judges 
In Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Life Ins. Co., on an issue of first 
impression, the Seventh Circuit decided that a party-appointed arbitrator has less rigorous 
impartiality standards than federal judges, thereby reversing district court’s judgment 
vacating the arbitral award.58 The court limited the standard for evident partiality for a 
party-appointed arbitrator to “conduct in transgression of contractual limitations.”59 The 
Seventh Circuit took a limited view on the arbitrator’s impartiality by reasoning that 
Commonwealth Coatings only required the arbitrator to be “disinterest[ed]” in a sense of 
financial entanglements with related parties.60 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s standard is 
defined more narrowly than the Second and Fifth Circuits’ standards.61 
                                                 
she was an arbitrator on the Venus Ford arbitration panel, which considered similar contract language and 
heard from the same damages expert as in the MMC proceedings”). 
52 Id. at 727. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 728. 
55 Dealer Comput. Servs., 485 F. App'x at 728. 
56 Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 285. 
57 Id. at 285-86. 
58 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2002). 
59 Id. at 621-22 (focusing on the difference between arbitration and adjudication, where arbitration, as a 
matter of contract, does not require an “appearance of partiality” ground of disqualification like that for 
judges). 
60 Id. at 623. 
61 See Koenig, supra note 22, at 269. 
In Trustmark Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., the Seventh Circuit followed 
the standard from Sphere Drake and found that an arbitrator should not be disqualified 
for having knowledge regarding previous arbitral proceedings between the same parties.62 
Thus, this decision is favorable to industries where repeat arbitrators are common.63 
However, this standard could leave room for uncertainty when the arbitrator is financially 
disinterested, but has a close relationship with a party that would require judicial recusal, 
such as close a personal relationship.64 
E. The Ninth Circuit: Appearance of Bias  
The Ninth Circuit followed Justice Black’s opinion in Commonwealth Coatings 
and applied the appearance of bias standard.65 In Schmitz v. Zilveti, the court found that 
Justice White’s concurring opinion did not reject the language of “appearance of bias,” 
and thus viewed Commonwealth Coatings as a majority opinion despite existing conflicts 
between Justice Black and White’s opinions.66 Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit 
defined evident partiality as “whether there are ‘facts showing a reasonable impression 
of partiality.’”67  Thus, the court concluded that, even if the arbitrator lacked actual 
knowledge, failure to disclose resulted by failure of investigating conflicts, which was 
sufficient grounds to vacate an arbitral award based on evident partiality.68  
Although the language “reasonable impression of partiality” appears in both the 
Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit’s standards, the application by each court differs.69 
The Fifth Circuit approach is more practical, because failure to disclose a trivial or 
insubstantial relationship between an arbitrator and related parties does not result in 
vacatur.70 This therefore preserves the finality of an arbitral award and discourages the 
losing party from challenging the arbitral award.71 
                                                 
62 Trustmark Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2011). 
63 See Koenig, supra note 22, at 275. 
64 See Koenig, supra note 22, at 276. 
65 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994). 
66 Id. at 1047. 
67 Id. at 1048. 
68 Id. at 1049; see also New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 
2007) (following Schmitz, 20 F.3d 1043).  
69 See Positive Software Sols., Inc., 476 F.3d at 283 (stating Schmitz is an outlier, and suggesting to read 
Justice White’s opinion holistically, thereby applying the reasonable impression of bias practically). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 285. 
III. FOREIGN JUDICIAL APPROACHES 
A. English Approach: Actual Bias Standard  
In England, international arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Act 1996 
(“EAA”).72 Similar to the FAA, the EAA limits the ability of the courts to review an 
arbitral award.73 Under the EAA, a procedural ground to challenge an award is referred 
as a “serious irregularity.”74 Lack of impartiality is not an express ground for challenges 
under the EAA.75 However it is considered within the breach of the general duties of the 
tribunal.76 The EAA considers lack of impartiality when it enumerates grounds on which 
a court may remove an arbitrator.77 Although the EAA refers to a “justifiable doubts” 
standard, English courts have largely used a high standard of “real danger of injustice,” 
making it difficult for to challenge an arbitral award based on an allegedly biased 
arbitrator.78  
The “real danger of injustice” standard requires a showing of actual bias.79 Thus, 
appearance of bias will not suffice to challenge an arbitral award.80 The real danger test 
initially derived from a criminal case, Regina v. Gough, where a member of the jury 
turned out to be a neighbor of the appellant.81 In Regina, the court established the real 
                                                 
72 Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 2 (Eng.).  
73 See Uva, supra note 10, at 482.  
74 Arbitration Act 1996, § 68. Serious irregularity refers to an irregularity, which caused or will cause 
substantial injustice to the applicant— “(a)failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty 
of tribunal); (b)the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction: 
see section 67); (c)failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure 
agreed by the parties; (d)failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it; (e)any arbitral 
or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award 
exceeding its powers; (f)uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award; (g)the award being obtained 
by fraud or the award or the way in which it was procured being contrary to public policy; (h)failure to 
comply with the requirements as to the form of the award; or (i)any irregularity in the conduct of the 
proceedings or in the award which is admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution or person 
vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award.”  
75 See Uva, supra note 10, at 486. 
76 See id. 
77 Arbitration Act 1996, c.23, § 24(1)(a) (“(a) that circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to his impartiality.”) 
78 See Uva, supra note 10, at 488. 
79 See id. 
80 See id.; see also Melworm, supra note 2, at 459. 
81 See Uva, supra note 10, at 488; see also Regina v. Gough, [1993] UKHL 1 (H.L).  
danger test as “whether there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member 
of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly 
regarded) with favour, or disfavor.”82  The real danger test subsequently became an 
applicable test in arbitration.83  
In AT&T v. Saudi Cable Co., a dispute arose between parties from an Agreement 
for the supply of cable in Saudi Arabia.84 The dispute led to International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration in London, which led to three partial awards in favor of 
Saudi Cable.85 Subsequently, AT&T challenged all three awards based on a lack of 
impartiality of the chairman of the tribunal in the Commercial Court.86 Mr. Fortier on his 
CV, failed to disclose his role as a non-executive director of Nortel, AT&T’s competitor 
in the bidding process of the project in dispute.87 The court considered the actual bias 
test and found no “real danger of bias,” aside from the procedural error.88 The court found 
that the failure to disclose his directorship was “innocent non-disclosure” and it was 
unrealistic to suggest that Mr. Fortier would have an interest to affect his impartiality.89 
This case illustrate the high bar of proving the real danger test in England.90  
In ASM Shipping v. TTMI, on the other hand, the court applied the “justifiable 
doubts” test referred to in the Arbitration Act and found partiality of an arbitrator.91 The 
Court found that private meetings with a party’s counsel during the hearing created an 
                                                 
82 See Regina v. Gough, [1993] UKHL 1, 14 (H.L). 
83 See Uva, supra note 10, at 489; see also AT&T v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127. 
84 AT&T, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 at 1. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (reviewing challenges, lower court dismissed AT&T’s request to set aside three partial award by the 
tribunal). 
87 Id. at 2 (describing this non-disclosure as “a most unfortunate secretarial error”).  
88 Id. at 7. 
89 AT&T, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 at 7 (providing, “(1) Mr. Fortier's position as a non-executive director of 
Nortel was an incidental rather than vital part of his professional life; . . . having neither the time nor 
inclination as a member of the bar and an international arbitrator to involve himself in the day to day 
commercial decisions of Nortel. (2) His shareholding of 474 common shares in Nortel was sufficiently 
small to be of no consequence. . . (4) The actual evidence of unconscious bias was no more than Mr. 
Fortier's non-executive directorship and his small shareholding in Nortel. Nothing that he had said or done 
in the arbitration proceedings had shown any bias of any kind. . . .”). 
90 See Uva, supra note 10, at 490. 
91 See ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 375 (finding partiality 
where one of the arbitrators had formerly acted as counsel in proceedings in which a key witness to the 
pending arbitration had allegedly failed to disclose documents).  
“appearance of bias for a fair-minded observer.92 The justifiable doubts test, which is 
also mentioned in Article 12 of the UNICITRAL Model Law, requires that “a fair minded 
and informed observer would conclude having considered the facts . . . real possibility 
that the tribunal was biased.”93 Although English courts seems to have two distinct 
standards there is no actual distinction between the “real danger of injustice” test and 
“justifiable doubts” test.94 Rather, the real meaning of the actual bias test or justifiable 
doubts test will rely on factual circumstances on a case by case basis.95   
In conclusion, the English approach— “real danger of injustice” or “justifiable 
doubts” test—requires a higher standard than the current U.S. standards; “reasonable 
person standard,” “reasonable impression of bias” standard, and the “appearance of bias” 
standard.96  The English approach, which requires the finding of actual bias or real 
possibility for bias, is inconsistent with Commonwealth Coatings, and subsequent circuit 
courts’ approach, which requires reasonable doubts but less than the actual bias. 97 
Because actual bias is one’s mental state, it is extremely difficult for parties to prove in 
the court with the limited facts or circumstantial evidences.98 Thus, the English courts 
approach would not be suitable for U.S. courts to adopt in the future.  
B. French Approach: More Liberal Approach, but Strict Compliance 
French courts approach the challenge of international arbitration awards more 
liberally than other European countries.99 By doing so, it has less restrictive grounds for 
challenging arbitral award than the grounds established under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (“NY Convention”).100 
Thus, under Code de Procedure Civile (“CPC”) the courts apply grounds for the challenge 
                                                 
92 ASM Shipping Ltd of India, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 375. 
93 Id.  
94 See Geoff Nicholas & Constantine Partasides, LCIA Court Decisions on Challenges to Arbitrators: A 
Proposal to Publish, 23 ARB. INT’L 1, 15-16 (2007). 
95 See CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 92 (2014). 
96 See AT&T, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 at 7; see also ASM Shipping Ltd of India, 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375; but see 
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149; Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 83; Positive Software Sols., 
Inc., 476 F.3d at 282; Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137; Scandinavian Reinsurance Co., 668 
F.3d at 78.  
97 See Rogers, supra note 95, at 93-94. 
98 See id. at 93. 
99 See Uva, supra note 10, at 498. 
100 See id. 
narrowly, and interfere only in extreme situations.101 Lack of impartiality of the arbitrator 
may be a ground for a setting aside a decision when the arbitrator fails to comply with 
due process.102 The French courts adopted the justifiable doubts test similar to other 
European countries; however, they apply stricter standards for the duty to disclose.103 
The duty to disclose is ongoing throughout the arbitral proceedings.104  
In J&P Avax Sa v. Societe Tecnimont SpA, a dispute arose between an Italian 
company and a Greek company regarding a contract to construct a propylene plant in 
Greece, which lead to ICC arbitration.105  After the award was rendered, J&P Avax 
challenged the award based on partiality.106 Mr. Javin, the chairman of the tribunal, was 
working for an international law firm that had provided several legal services to 
Tecnimont in the past.107 However, the issue in the case was not failure to disclose this 
facts, but rather that Mr. Javin failed to disclose that his law firm had been providing 
some of the legal services during the arbitral proceeding.108 The court held that the 
arbitrator had an ongoing duty to disclose throughout the arbitral proceeding, and failure 
to disclose all relevant facts was sufficient to raise justifiable doubts on the arbitrator’s 
impartiality.109 
In SA Auto Guadeloupe Investissements v. Columbus Acquisitions Inc., the court 
addressed the difficulty in complying with this strict standard for an arbitrator.110 The 
sole arbitrator disclosed that his firm, another branch, had advised Leucadia, one of the 
related groups of companies, in unrelated matters in the past.111 The parties consented to 
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104 See Melworm, supra note 2, at 457. 




109 Id. The decision was overturned by the Cour de cassation on other grounds on Nov. 4, 2010. 
110 SA Auto Guadeloupe Investissements v. Columbus Acquisitions Inc., Cour d’Appeal, Paris, Oct. 14, 
2014, 13/13459. 
111 Id. (disclosing that his firm's Toronto office has represented Leucadia, however no longer representing 
or providing legal advice to Leucadia).  
his appointment.112 However, after the arbitrator rendered several interim awards, AGI 
challenged the awards on the ground that the arbitrator failed to disclose that, at some 
point during the arbitral proceeding, the client relationship between arbitrator’s law firms 
and Leucadia resumed.113 The Paris Court of Appeal held that, although, at the time of 
appointment, the arbitrator did not acknowledge his law firm had resumed legal advice to 
Leucadia, it was sufficient to raise reasonable doubt for AGI of his impartiality.114  
In conclusion, the French courts’ liberal approach of reviewing an arbitral award, 
burdens arbitrators greatly to disclose all relevant facts that could raise reasonable doubts 
of his or her impartiality.115 This burden raises an issue in the current legal markets.116 
International law firms have several branches in different countries and not all conflicts 
of interest are easily or readily discoverable for the arbitrator.117 Therefore, imposing a 
duty on the arbitrator to disclose all relevant facts would unreasonably burden arbitrator 
to check possible conflicts of interest among different branches of his law firm.118 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
Although many European countries adopt the UNICITRAL model law— 
“justifiable doubts” standard—it does not give clear guidelines for arbitrators on what 
information and how much information they have to disclose to the parties.119 Given this 
uncertainty, it is worthwhile to discuss international arbitration institutions’ approaches 
governing an arbitrator’s duty to disclose.  
In particular, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) allows parties to challenge an award in full or in part by composing an ad hoc 
committee under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.120 An ad hoc committee will be 
                                                 
112 SA Auto Guadeloupe Investissements, 13/13459. 
113 Id. (challenging the award based on that while the arbitration proceedings were ongoing, three lawyers 
from the arbitrator's law firm were assisting Leucadia with a transaction). 
114 Id. 
115 See Melworm, supra note 2, at 457; see also Uva, supra note 10, at 501; Elie Kleiman, Independence 
and impartiality: Supreme Court confirms stern approach to duty of disclosure, Lexology (2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=28cb7ca6-4c1d-4faf-bbe9-fd4b019c4f45.  
116 See Kleiman, supra note 115. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. 
119 See Arbitration Act 1996, c.23, § 24(1)(a) (Eng.); see also CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C] [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1520 (Fr.); ZICILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 1059 
(Ger.). 
120 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Art. 52 (2006), (“(1) 
Either party may request annulment of the award by an application . . . on one or more of the following five 
grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded 
compromised of three panelists, who were not originally involved in the arbitral 
proceedings upon parties’ request. 121  This appeal procedure precludes judicial 
intervention, thereby providing confidentiality and efficiency for the parties. However, if 
the unsatisfied party chooses to challenge the final award in national court, it will further 
delay the arbitral proceedings. 
Many institutions including the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and 
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), introduced ethical guidelines 
for arbitrators to comply with the duty to disclose, thereby establishing a self-regulating 
system.122 The AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (“AAA’s 
Code of Ethics”), contains a provision stressing an arbitrator’s duty to disclose. 123 
Interestingly, the AAA states that “any doubt as to whether or not disclosure is to be made 
should be resolved in favor of disclosure.”124 Cannon II first established a broad range 
of matters to be disclosed when one is appointed as an arbitrator.125 At the same time, 
the AAA’s Code of Ethics also imposes on an arbitrator a duty to investigate.126 The duty 
to disclose is an ongoing duty throughout the arbitral proceedings.127 The AAA imposes 
on an arbitrator a duty to disclose any interest or relationship that will “reasonably affect 
                                                 
its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a 
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons 
on which it is based”); see also Park, supra note 49, at 667. 
121 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID CONVENTION, ART. 52(3) (2006). 
122 See Rogers, supra note 95, at 83. 




124 Id. at Cannon II D; see also Melworm, supra note 2, at 467 (The Code will be applied realistically to 
prevent that detailed disclosure duty does not become so great burden to arbitrator). 
125 Id. at Cannon II A (“Persons who are requested to serve as arbitrators should, before accepting, disclose: 
(1) any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (2) any 
known existing or past financial, business, professional or personal relationships which might reasonably 
affect impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties. . . They should also disclose 
any such relationships involving their families or household members or their current employers, partners, 
or professional or business associates that can be ascertained by reasonable efforts; (3) the nature and extent 
of any prior knowledge they may have of the dispute; and (4) any other matters, relationships, or interests 
which they are obligated to disclose by the agreement of the parties, the rules or practices of an institution, 
or applicable law regulating arbitrator disclosure.”) 
126 Id. at Cannon II B (“Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should make a 
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relationships described in paragraph A.”)  
127 Id. at Cannon II C (“The obligation to disclose interests or relationships described in paragraph A is a 
continuing duty which requires a person who accepts appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as soon as 
practicable, at any stage of the arbitration, any such interests or relationships which may arise, or which are 
recalled or discovered.”) 
impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.”128 In addition to 
the AAA’s Code of Ethics, the AAA also applies a “one-strike-you’re-out” policy to 
regulate arbitrators.129  
The SIAC’s Code of Ethics for an Arbitrator is less extensive and detailed as 
compared to the AAA’s Code of Ethics.130 Similar to the AAA’s standard, the SIAC 
requires arbitrators to disclose all relevant facts throughout the arbitral proceedings.131 
However, it adopts the justifiable doubts standard.132  
Aside from these two institutions, other institutions such as the Milan Chamber 
of National and International Arbitration, 133  the Canadian Commercial Arbitration 
Centre,134 the Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-
Canada,135 and the Arbitration Centre of the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 136  have adopted their own code of ethics. Other institutions such as, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the London Court of International 
Arbitration (“LCIA”) have not introduced separate code of ethics. 137  Despite, 
international arbitration institutions’ efforts to regulate arbitrator’s impartiality, one of 
the practical criticisms is that most institutions do not publicize any sanctions, and 
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130 See Singapore International Arbitration Centre, SIAC Code of Ethics for an Arbitrator, Art. 1.1 (2015), 
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133 See Milan Chamber of Commerce, International Arbitration Rules: Code of Ethics of Arbitrators, 
(2004), http://www.camera-arbitrale.it/en/Arbitration/Arbitration+Rules/Code+of+ethics.php?id=104.  
134  See Canadian Commercial Arbitration Centre, Code of Ethics,  http://www.ccac-adr.org/en/code-
deontologie.php. 
135 See Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada, Code of Ethics 
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136 See The Arbitration Centre of the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Arbitrators’ Code 
of Ethics, (2014),  
http://www.centrodearbitragem.pt/images/pdfs/Legislacao_e_Regulamentos/Regulamento_de_Arbitrage
m/Arbitrators_Code_of_Ethics_2014.pdf. 
137 See International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules Art. 14 (2017), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-
resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_14,; see also The London Court of International 
Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules Art. 5.4 (2014), 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx - Article 5.  
therefore lacking practical impacts.138 Although a sanctioned arbitrator may be barred to 
sit in an arbitral proceedings in a particular institution, if the record is not shared to other 
institutions or parties, the arbitrator may still sit in other arbitral proceedings without any 
limitations. In addition, the lack of a unified standard may impose a burden on arbitrators 
to investigate each institutions standards. 
Apart from the arbitration institutions, the 2004 International Bar Associations 
(“IBA”) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitrators (“IBA 
Guidelines”) provides extensive and detailed guidelines on arbitrator’s disclosure on 
possible conflicts of interest.139 The IBA Guidelines adopts an objective standard of 
justifiable doubts, 140  and illustrates various situations depending on the severity of 
possible conflicts involved divided into different categories. 141  The Red (Non-
Waivable) list illustrates the situations that will incur the conflicts. 142  The Red 
(Waivable) list illustrates the situations that are “serious but not as severe,” thus it could 
be waived by parties’ express consent.143 The Orange list illustrates the situations that 
may give rise to doubts for arbitrator’s partiality depending on the factual 
circumstances. 144  The Green list illustrates the situations where no actual or no 
appearance of partiality exists.145  The IBA Guidelines gives a clearer guidelines to 
arbitrators on what to disclose, and at the same time expose a greater duty for arbitrators 
to disclose possible conflicts depending on the factual situations listed in the IBA 
guidelines.146 With the extensive illustrations listed in the IBA Guidelines, parties could 
objectively assess the impartiality of the arbitrator. 147  The IBA Guidelines give 
quantitative categories to determine the standards of impartiality, different from other 
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140 Id. at Part I: General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure (“The wording 
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144 See IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitrator, Part II.  
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147 Id.; see also Park, supra note 49, at 676. 
national and international sources.148 Although, the IBA Guidelines are a soft law, which 
lack binding effects, arbitrators and other arbitration institutions have used it as a relevant 
authority.149  
Realistic approaches seem to be that parties could make a reference to the IBA 
guidelines in their arbitration agreement, or institutions could do so similar to the 
ACICA. 150  By incorporating the IBA guidelines to the arbitration agreements or 
institutional rules, an arbitrator’s impartiality issue can be governed by whether the 
arbitrator fulfilled his or her duty to disclose in accordance with the IBA guidelines. 
Because the IBA guidelines provide various factual illustrations, it will be easier to assess 
arbitrator’s impartiality. Under this framework, the courts can conduct a more efficient 
and objective review. For instances rather than focusing factual intensive review, if the 
arbitrator failed to disclose potential conflicts listed in the Red list of the IBA guidelines, 
the court can automatically consider that the arbitrator lacks impartiality. By contrast, if 
the arbitrator failed to disclose something listed in the Green list of the IBA guidelines, 
the court can find that the failure to disclose does not affect the arbitrator’s impartiality. 
Only in case of the Orange list, the court will use its standard to assess arbitrator’s 
impartiality.  
V. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS? 
An arbitrator’s impartiality often becomes a matter of disclosure. In a departure 
from Commonwealth Coatings, the U.S. courts have developed various standards to 
review an arbitrator’s impartiality. However, these various standards such as the 
“reasonable person standard,” the “reasonable impression of bias” standard, and the 
“appearance of bias” standard, have given little guidance to the arbitrator, to the parties 
and to the courts. The practical criticism regarding the current U.S. courts approach is 
that, to address arbitrator’s impartiality, the courts have to conduct factual intensive 
reviews case by case. This is because the current U.S. standards require more than a mere 
appearance of bias. This practical difference also exists in other jurisdictions such as 
England and France, adopting the “actual bias,” and “reasonable doubt” standards.  
One possible solution could be an arbitration institutions’ self-regulating system. 
Institutional efforts to self-regulate registered arbitrators could eventually lead similar to 
American Bar Associations’ self-regulating system.151 However, this approach has a 
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practical limitation because most institutions do not publicize the sanctions. Due to the 
lack of public records regarding arbitrator sanctions, parties in the future arbitral 
proceedings will not have a record regarding arbitrator’s sanctions, and therefore lacking 
practical deterrence to appoint that particular arbitrator.  
Similar to the ICSID ad hoc committee, an arbitration appeal procedure could be 
an interesting solution. Unlike a court’s reviewing process, it is time-efficient, preserves 
confidentiality, and comports with the purpose of arbitration. However, this approach has 
greater uncertainty for implementation. It will require each institution to introduce an ad 
hoc committee. In addition, even after the ad hoc committee decided an arbitrator’s 
impartiality issue, if the parties still choose to challenge final awards in the national court, 
it may invite intentional delay of arbitral proceedings by unsatisfied parties. 
Realistic approaches seem to be that parties could make a reference to the IBA 
guidelines in their arbitration agreement, or in institutions’ ethical code. By incorporating 
the IBA guidelines, the courts can assess an arbitrator’s impartiality by considering 
whether arbitrator fulfilled their duty to disclosure in accordance with the IBA guidelines. 
Under this framework, the courts can conduct more efficient and objective review.  
                                                 
regulates attorney’s ethics based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct. In addition, each state 
has adopted a state code of ethics resembling the ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct.  
